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Abstract: The crime of genocide is the newest international crime. It must be kept as a separate, distinct,
and coherent concept. It is the first truly subjective crime; all other crime, though requiring mens rea,
require only that the defendant consciously committed the criminal acts. In the case of genocide, however,
the underlying criminal acts are no different from the acts required to prove ordinary crimes. The
difference is one of motive. What is being punished by the crime of genocide is the selection of victims
according to their involuntary membership in four kinds of groups: national, ethnical, racial, or religious.
The distinctiveness of this new crime turns on how seriously prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges in
future cases take and examine evidence of a defendant’s motives.
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[pg119]* I’d like to be mentioned, at least in a footnote, in the biography someone
will write someday about that great gentleman and scholar, Leslie C. Green. A number
of years ago, when Professor Green was not well known in the United States, he
submitted some of his essays on international law to Transnational Publishers, Inc. As a
member of that board, the publisher, Heike Fenton, called me up and asked for my
appraisal of a book containing these essays. She let me know that it would probably be a
losing proposition, since essay collections (at that time at least) hardly ever repaid their
cost of publication. I had an idea that could suit her and Professor Green at the same
time. I suggested to Heike that she might want to consider going back to Professor Green
and saying that although she would not be able to publish the particular essays he had
submitted to her, she would be very interested if he would submit all the essays he had
written on the law of war. Of course I was familiar with these essays, and I thought that
their collection in a single volume might work from a publisher’s standpoint.
The rest is history. Leslie Green graciously complied by submitting a number of
his essays on the law of war, resulting in the book Essays on the Modern Law of War. Its
fame and fortune grew, and is now in its second edition. It has often been used as a text
in military academies, and undoubtedly influenced the Naval War College to extend to
Professor Green an invitation to become a holder of the Stockton Chair—unusual for a
scholar who is not an American citizen. [pg120] Professor Green has served with
distinction as the Stockton Professor of International Law at the Naval War College, and
has continued to contribute to the development of the law of war as a leading scholar in
that field. I feel lucky in helping to steer his (scholar)ship in the right direction at the
right time.
I am contributing some thoughts about Genocide to this collection of essays in
honor of my dear friend Leslie Green precisely because genocide is not a topic that
appears among his many essays on the law of war. If it had been, I would have felt
preempted. Of course, Professor Green has talked about genocide in his discussions of
the laws of war, including crimes against humanity (it would have been astounding if he
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had not done so). There is nothing he has said about the topic that I could criticize even
if I were bold enough to do so. But because he has not contributed a specific essay on the
topic, I submit the following essay as a compliment (complement) to his works. Of
course, in a way it is too soon to write about genocide. The law on that subject is
developing rapidly as the result of the work of the two ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. In addition, various national
courts have recently had occasion to consider charges of genocide. If I were to attempt
here an essay that dealt with all the judicial glosses to date on the crime of genocide, it
would be outdated the minute it is published. Thus I will confine myself to considerations
of a greater generality. I hope these can help illuminate two major underlying factors in
the recent and unique international crime of genocide, factors that will undoubtedly
persist as a theme in the many judicial developments in the near future that will elaborate
upon, specify and further explicate the crime of genocide as applied to particular cases.
The Need for a Coherent Definition
The term “genocide” is popular with journalists because it seems to give an
immediate and sensational dimension to their reports. Its overuse extends to academics
who see no need to be careful about the terms they use. For example, the well-known
political scientist Rudolph Rummel cited as instances of “genocide” (1) “the denial of
ethnic Hawaiian culture by the American-run public school system in Hawaii”; (2)
“government policies letting one race adopt the children of another race”; (3) “South
African Apartheid”; and (4) “the Jewish Holocaust.”FN1 As early as 1951, Paul Robeson
and William Patterson submitted a petition to United Nations charging “genocidal crimes
of federal, state, and municipal governments in the United States against 15,000,000
African-Americans.”FN2 Clearly the term “genocide” can be stretched so far as to lose
any distinctive or coherent meaning.
[pg121] Coherence is a virtue not just in legal definitions, but in enabling us to
think about the relation of any given term to all nearby terms. Ken Kress writes:
An idea or theory is coherent if it hangs or fits together. If its parts are mutually supportive, if it is
intelligible, if it flows from or expresses a single, unified viewpoint. An idea or theory is
incoherent if it is unintelligible, inconsistent, ad hoc, fragmented, disjointed, or contains thoughts
that are unrelated to and do not support one another.FN3

Coherence is important because it relates to the core responsibility of the judicial
Enterprise.FN4 Ronald Dworkin has argued forcefully for the overarching imperative of
“law as integrity,”FN5 which
requires our judges, so far as this is possible, to treat our present system of public standards as
expressing and respecting a coherent set of principles, and, to that end, to interpret these standards
to find implicit standards between and beneath the explicit ones.FN6

Professor Dworkin’s reference in this quotation to a “coherent set of principles” is later
expanded:
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Integrity demands that the public standards of the community be both made and seen, so far as this
is possible, to express a single, coherent scheme of justice and fairness in the right relation.FN7

These general propositions take on special significance when applied to the
judicial definition of genocide, the world’s most heinous crime. Genocide is ancient in
fact and new in definition. In Biblical times there were acts of deliberate destruction of
national, ethnical, racial or religious groups as such. The Turkish slaughter of Armenians
in 1915 is now widely regarded as genocide. But the precise term was coined by Raphael
Lemkin in 1944.FN8 Lemkin used the new word loosely, including within its scope
attacks on political and social institutions, attacks on culture and language, and even
attacks on national feelings. His use of the word was so broad that it did not necessarily
including the killing or harming of persons.
However, when the horrors of the Holocaust gradually became known to the
public at the end of the Second World War, the General Assembly of the United Nations
passed a resolution affirming genocide to be a crime under international law. Included in
the 1946 resolution were acts of destruction against groups on “religious, racial, political,
or any other grounds.”FN9 Although the UN’s definition was narrower than Lemkin’s,
the inclusion of “political” and “or any other” [pg122] grounds still made it overly broad.
For example, any civil war would automatically constitute genocide because each side
would be attempting to destroy the other in order to take over the government—in short,
for political reasons. And by adding “or any other grounds,” genocide would apply to
any war at all.
If in 1944 the concept of genocide was vastly overinclusive, and in 1946 plainly
overinclusive, in 1948 the definition was finally pinned down. Not only did the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of GenocideFN10 present an
internationally binding definition, but the words of that definition have been repeated
verbatim many times in constitutive instruments of ad hoc international criminal
tribunals, the statute of the proposed International Criminal Court, and in various judicial
decisions in national as well as international tribunals:
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

This language formulated in 1948 was well-chosen. Even though many of the delegates
to the drafting of the Genocide Convention had their own agendas to promote, the result
of their deliberations is a definition that is remarkably coherent in the sense I have been
discussing. This is not to say that the definition is without difficulties; hardly any
definition can ever be said to be perfect. Yet with this definition as a reference point, let
us consider some of the specific issues that have caused some problems in relation to the
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coherency of the crime of genocide: “group,” “specific intent,” and the relation to
“ethnic cleansing.” Of course other issues will arise in cases yet unlitigated, but as of the
time of this writing, these three topics seem most salient.
Restrictions as to Group Membership
The most immediately notable restriction in the 1948 definition of “genocide” is
the exclusion of political groups and the concomitant decision not to make the idea of
groups open-ended (in contrast to the 1946 Resolution inclusion of “or any other
grounds”). Why were political groups excluded in the [pg123] 1948 Convention even
though they had been included in the 1946 Resolution? A sufficient historical reason is
that the Soviet Union insisted upon the exclusion of political groups, probably out of a
well-founded fear that Josef Stalin could be accused of genocide when he presided over
the largest political slaughter in history in the 1930s. But there is a much better logical
reason for the exclusion of membership in political groups: such membership is
voluntary. Thus, a person who joins such a group in a sense controls her own destiny.
To be sure, if she is killed because she is a member of a particular political group, it is
still murder. From the international point of view, if civilians are killed because of their
membership in a political group (or any group at all), it is still a crime against humanity
or (if the killing occurs during armed conflict) a war crime.
“Genocide,” to have standing as a separate crime, must be distinguishable from
group destruction. The framers of the Geneva Convention settled on a definition that
appears to have singled out victims of genocide as involuntary members of a group.
There is something universally felt to be particularly heinous in murder based on a group
affiliation that the victim could not have avoided. Thus, of the four groups listed in the
Genocide Convention, it is at the outset clear that membership in “racial” or “ethnic”
groups is involuntary; a child is born into such groups by parentage. The “national”
group is for the most part involuntary, as it is conferred by birth. In a small percentage of
cases people may be able to emigrate and obtain a new nationality, but for the vast
majority of people their nationality effectively remains involuntary. Only “religion,” of
the four categories, is of mixed voluntariness. Most people are born into a religion, and
therefore their religious status is involuntary into their teenage years. Later they may
“drop out” or affirmatively join a different religious group. Yet they may be targeted in a
genocidal campaign because of the religion into which they were born. During the
Yugoslavian civil wars in the past decade, where in some provinces Serbs were in the
minority and in other provinces Muslims were the minority group, group membership
was identified in many cases by the victim’s name. Under the Islamic religion, children
are given one of a distinctive list of Muslim names, and in former Yugoslavia at least,
non-Muslim children were not given any of those Muslim names. Hence the name itself
was enough to identify a person as belonging to the religious minority or majority in any
given town. If a minority person stated that he had changed his religion, he probably
would not have been believed by the persecutors.
An instructive analogue can be drawn between genocide and the recent legislative
phenomenon of “hate crimes” in the domestic law of several countries. A hate crime is
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generally defined as a crime against person because that [pg124] person is a member of a
group that the perpetrator hates. Although the underlying crime is of course punishable
under the criminal law, the penalty for the crime is enhanced if it constitutes a hate crime.
In a recent shocking case in the United States, a black teenager was walking along on the
sidewalk of a white Northern suburb, minding his own business, when he was suddenly
attacked and killed by a white teenage gang. The gang had simply determined to kill the
next black person who walked by. Although the murder itself was punishable by life
imprisonment, the fact that it was motivated by a hatred of the group to which the victim
belonged led the sentencing judge to deny the possibility of parole.
Many criminologists and lay observers have lobbied against the enactment of hate
crimes on the deceptively simple ground that “a crime is a crime, regardless of motive.”
To the contrary, I think it is a civilizational improvement to deter especially the crimes
and harms committed against people just because of their status as involuntary members
of a group. To be sure this kind of “discrimination” has been around since Biblical times,
and in the past few centuries the Jews in many countries have been the special target of
such discriminatory maltreatment. The Third Reich brought this discrimination to a
legislative focus, and if any “good” can be said to have come of the Holocaust, it can
only be an enduring legacy that genocide under international law and “hate crimes” under
domestic law are a coherent category all their own—a crime more heinous than the
underlying criminal act itself.
Specific Intent
There is no doubt that, from a prosecutor’s point of view, genocide is a harder
crime to prove than most international violations of humanitarian law. It is difficult for
the prosecutor to discharge the burden of proving a specific intent to commit genocide.
Contrary to popular belief, this difficulty is not due to the fact that genocide is a more
serious crime with more serious consequences. Rather, it relates to the fact that motive is
a specific intent of the crime itself. Thus, the 1948 Convention in its opening clause uses
the word “intent” and each of the enumerated actions begins with the language of intent:
“killing,” “causing,” “deliberately inflicting,” “imposing measures intended to,” and
“forcibly transferring.”
Defense attorneys will typically argue that in order to prove genocidal intent, the
prosecutor must present evidence of a “plan” of genocide. This might consist of
transcripts of a conspiratorial meeting, or a military directive, or some other evidence of a
prearranged policy to destroy a national, ethnical, religious, [pg125] or racial group.
Presumably these defense attorneys have a mental image like that of the Wannsee
Conference depicted in a chilling film of that same name. The movie shows the meeting
that took place in a Berlin suburb in January 1942 in which Nazi leaders calmly discussed
the complex plans of the “Final Solution.” The movie, matching in running time the
actual conference, was based on minutes taken at the conference itself and recovered
when Germany surrendered in 1945.
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I doubt that any international criminal court will accept a defense request that the
prosecutor prove a “plan” based on actual minutes or documents of such a meeting as the
Wannsee Conference. As a practical matter, it is highly unlikely that any minutes or
records will ever be taken again of a conspiratorial meeting to commit genocide; the
threat to the participants of future prosecution based on those minutes or documents is
sufficient to rule out any such evidentiary compilation in the future. Indeed, a plausible
hypothesis based on evidence coming out of the civil wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s
may be that some political and military leaders may have deliberately created records,
documents, minutes, and directives that were directly contrary to their verbal instructions.
For it would be contrary to rational self-interest for any political or military commander
these days to expose himself or herself to future prosecution based on command
responsibility. Instead, “plausible denial” might be created by giving face-to-face verbal
orders that are contrary to the “paper record” of directives and documents that forbid
recourse to violations of international humanitarian law.
But even apart from sophisticated coverups and deniability, the need for a plan is
overstated by my hypothetical defense counsel. If during a person intends in his own
mind to harm or kill another person based on the victim’s membership in one of the
enumerated groups, that is sufficient for a charge of genocide. Perhaps if it is a single
murder a prosecutor would not prosecute the defendant for “genocide” but only for
murder; however, if it is part of an event where the defendant and others are killing
innocent people based on the victims’ group membership, or if the defendant himself is
killing a number of people for that reason, then the charge of “genocide” is in my view
supportable.
A more nuanced problem concerning the proof of specific motive to commit
genocide came up in the course of the preliminary briefing and truncated trial of Dr.
Milan Kovacevic at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The
prosecutor, Michael Keegan, cited public speeches and television appearances by Dr.
Kovacevic in which he urged Muslim citizens of Prijedor to leave the town and go
elsewhere because, as he put it, Serbs and Muslims cannot live peaceably together.
These speeches occurred some [pg126] months prior to the civil war that raged through
Prijedor, resulting in a takeover by the Serbs and the killing, raping, and forcible
evacuation of most of the Moslem population. Dr. Kovacevic was charged with
genocide—the first Serb to be so charged by the Tribunal. The question was whether his
public speeches constituted evidence of genocidal intent sufficient to satisfy the requisites
of the crime.FN11
As the lead counsel of Dr. Kovacevic’s defense team, I met alone with Prosecutor
Keegan to discuss plea-bargaining possibilities. He seemed quite convinced that my
client’s public speeches and television appearances constituted proof of the specific intent
to commit genocide. The indictment against Dr. Kovacevic did not charge him of any
genocidal decisions or acts; it simply pointed to the existence of the speeches and
television tapes and linked them to Dr. Kovacevic’s political position as deputy mayor of
the town of Prijedor. I asked Mr. Keegan whether the prosecution had any evidence of
any directive signed by my client that ordered the commission of any harm toward any
6

persons in Prijedor, and Mr. Keegan said he had no such evidence. In fact, there was no
evidence that my client did anything except the making of public speeches and the
signing of routine municipal orders (such as the hour for turning off street lights,
decisions as to water supply, and the like).
Mr. Keegan, as a plea bargain, would consider a reduced sentence, but was not
willing to discuss changing the charge of genocide to a lesser war crimes charge. I
argued that my client, as the director of the Prijedor general hospital, was a man of
healing and not a man of killing. In addition, Dr. Kovacevic invariably treated Serbian
and Muslim patients equally, and he invited to join his staff at the hospital a number of
Muslim doctors who had been the victims of prejudice in other Serbian towns. But Mr.
Keegan replied with the image of the Nazi “death doctor” who may have been a man of
healing but who did not hesitate to carry out inhuman and deadly experiments on Jewish
victims. Our meeting was a standstill; we were too far apart from any plea bargain.
I decided that Mr. Keegan’s point was well taken. If he could demonstrate a
genocidal intent from the inflammatory speeches that Dr. Kovacevic made, it would be
very difficult for me to rebut that intent by testimonials as to Dr. Kovacevic’s character as
a man of healing. Yet I was convinced from the voluminous evidence and interviews
with his family and friends that Dr. Kovacevic would never intentionally harm anyone.
Whether I was right or wrong about this was not something I could know for sure, but I
was sufficiently convinced of it to throw all my energies into a vigorous defense of this
man. I would never argue to the Tribunal that heinous crimes did not occur, or that the
Serbs were justified because of historical brutalities against them to commit such crimes.
[pg127] Rather, my entire defense would consist of the specific innocence of my client to
the charge of genocide.
This brings me to my client’s speeches and television interviews which, I was
sure, would have a highly negative emotional impact upon the judges of the tribunal
when they were read out in court or shown on the courtroom television monitors. They
suggested that Dr. Kovacevic was something of a firebrand and idealogue, one who could
be held guilty of contributing to a negative atmosphere in Prijedor that made the
subsequent attack by the Serbian army and paramilitaries all the more effective and
brutal. I was certain that the prosecutor would provide the requisite rhetorical
underpinning to the speeches and interviews, leaving me with an uphill battle to explain
why those speeches and interviews did not constitute evidence of a specific motive of
genocide.
I believed that there was a completely different way to interpret my client’s
speeches and television interviews. He was doing his best to exhort the Muslim
population of Prijedor to leave town before it was too late. Although the Muslim and
Serb population in the town was at that time practically equal (at close to 43% each), Dr.
Kovacevic knew from his position as deputy mayor that the strategic importance of the
Prijedor corridor from the Serbian military point of view made inevitable a military
takeover by the Serbian army. And indeed that is what happened in April 1992, followed
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by forced evacuations of Muslims and internment in detention centers, often under brutal
conditions. Some Muslims were tortured and killed in those camps.
I go into this level of detail to show that two diametrically opposite interpretations
are possible of the same speeches by a public official such as Dr. Kovacevic. He could
either have been contributing to an atmosphere of hatred or doing his best to protect
people whom he knew would inevitably be victims of a forcible military takeover. How
this would have played out at trial we’ll never know; Dr. Kovacevic died of an aneurism
in the detention center at The Hague after two weeks of his trial. How indeed would the
prosecutor have proved specific intent? To be sure, Dr. Kovacevic never said to the
Muslims in his audience that they would be better off getting out of town. The
prosecutor would have underlined this omission. Yet a public official is not free to say
anything he desires in public. If he had put the matter so plainly to the citizens of
Prijedor, he would have been accused of not doing his job properly as deputy mayor. He
would have been criticized for trying to get rid of half the population of the city instead
of working with them and establishing conditions of peace and mutual trust. Thus,
knowing what he knew about Serbian military plans, he could only speak in a kind of
code. He said things such as “The Serbs and Muslims can never live in peace together
even in a hundred years.” Coming [pg128] from a Serb, this kind of talk could signal to
the Muslims in his audience: “get out of town while you can.” But the opposite
interpretation is also possible: that Dr. Kovacevic was contributing to an atmosphere of
hatred. Surely if he had himself acted overtly—such as signing an order for the
destruction or harm or even incarceration of Muslim citizens, or participating himself in
any acts of torture or murder—then his public speeches would have been sufficient, in
my opinion, to satisfy the prosecution’s burden to prove genocide. But without any overt
act, with only the attribution of genocide to Dr. Kovacevic by virtue of his position as
deputy mayor of the town, then the interpretation of his speeches as amounting to a
specific genocidal motive would not appear to me to satisfy the prosecution’s burden of
proof.FN12
The foregoing dilemma of interpretation is, I suggest, often applicable to officials
accused of participating in genocide. An individual official may have been doing his or
her best to mitigate the evil, to spare as many lives as possible. It is easy after the fact for
us to say that such an official should simply have resigned. But in a situation where the
official is bucking a pervasive tide, resignation would simply lead to his or her
replacement by a less principled person. The argument is a logical one: if a person of
principle is morally required to resign rather than participate in a genocidal plan (a plan
that she would do her best to frustrate if she stayed in office), then if she is replaced by
another person of equal or higher principles, the same logic would compel the latter to
resign as well. Hence, resignation out of moral scruples will tend to lead to replacement
by persons who have no moral scruples. Accordingly, courts should be alert to these
individual moral dilemmas and not be too ready to condemn any official “associated”
with a genocidal plan (or other violations of humanitarian war) as legally complicitous
with the crime. To do so would be to swing too far in a counterproductive direction. The
requirement of specific intent in the definition of genocide should be proven by
convincing evidence even if it may result in a protracted trial, due to the danger (of which
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the Kovacevic case may be an example) not only of convicting an innocent person but of
convicting a moral hero.
Conclusion: Coherence and Distinctiveness
The crime of genocide is the newest international crime. It must be kept as a
separate, distinct, and coherent concept. It is the first truly subjective crime; all other
crime, though requiring mens rea, require only that the defendant consciously committed
the criminal acts. In the case of genocide, however, the underlying criminal acts are no
different from the acts required to prove ordinary [pg129] crimes. The difference is one
of motive. What is being punished by the crime of genocide is the selection of victims
according to their involuntary membership in four kinds of groups: national, ethnical,
racial, or religious. The distinctiveness of this new crime turns on how seriously
prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges in future cases take and examine evidence of a
defendant’s motives.
The coherence of the crime of genocide is partly a result of taking specific motive
seriously, but also a result of keeping the four enumerated groups clearly in mind. To
extend the crime of genocide to killings—even mass killings—that are not based on
membership in the four groups is to cheapen the concept and eventually render it
redundant. If genocide, as I have argued, constitutes an advance in the development of
human rights in our civilization, it ought to be interpreted and applied in accordance with
a coherent and distinct interpretation of the remarkable language defining the crime that
was brought into being by the Genocide Convention.
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